The General Staff booklet (see yesterday’s post) is lucid with regard to the importance and progression of air combat missions. It states that an aerial offensive is conducted in due order through i) Offensive Patrols ii) CAS and battlefield exclusion measures iii) Strategic bombing. Point ii) echoes back to the currently prevalent concept of ”shaping the battlespace” to suit the attacking force, don’t you think?
Anyway, for the benefit of people doubting the utility of ”pure” fighter missions far remote the surly bonds of earth, the booklet states that
”The sole mission of offensive patrols is to find and defeat the enemy’s aeroplanes. Their normal sphere of action extends for som 20 miles [times 5 with WWII standards and without limit by today’s world] behind the hostile battle line, and the further back they can engage the enemy’s fighting aeroplanes the more immunity will they secure for our machines doing artillery work, photography and close reconnaissance.// Fighting may take place at any height up to the limit to which the machine can ascend, known as its ”ceiling.” Artillery observation imposes a limit of some 10,000 feet, but fighting, bombing and photographic machines may fly at any height up to 20,000 feet or even more [double that for WWII-era machines]. Offensive patrols must therefore work echelloned in height.”
This parapgraph and particularly the last point, relative to practice in the online arena, is significant inasmuch the bulk of virtual pilots have a strong inclination to engaging in aerial combat directly above a contested locale in the frontline and largely shun the more effective deep and high missions, indeed, scoff at them. Furthermore, when groups of online pilots do venture into the deep, they seldom do so echelloned in three dimensions – you may see a sweep or a raid, but it is almost exclusively restricted to a single altitude and a single (moving) point in space.
So, what of it? Why this argument? Well, in terms of online air combat, I like to argue for an arena that comprises more than the run-of-the-mill self-perpetuating furball. This is a behaviourial matter that must start with giving people a cause for doing something else than trucking to the nearest hot spot du jour, i.e. factories and infrastructure in the rear, bombers to pulverize them and escort fighters to accompany the bombers. Without these components tied plausibly into the realm, air action will ever be arcadish. And with these components in place, there must be participants able and willing to conduct ops in a convincing manner – solid groupings of tactically proficient pilots. Quite a quest, n’est-ce-pas?